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“[T]he extreme complexity of medicine has become more than an 
individual clinician can handle. But not more than teams of 
clinicians can handle.” 
-Atul Gawande1 
INTRODUCTION 
Ruben Nunez arrived at the San Diego county jail in August 2015, 
bearing a sheaf of papers that should have saved his life.2 Nunez had 
been transferred from a hospital, and those papers contained all the 
instructions needed for a new set of doctors to keep him healthy. But 
the handoff from hospital to jail failed, and Nunez died in pre-trial 
detention. Mr. Nunez suffered from a number of life-threatening 
conditions, which were all described in his medical records. But, due to 
a lack of time or attention, the jail doctors missed this information in 
the thick stack of papers. If, instead, the jail had used a system that more 
effectively flagged those life-threatening symptoms, Mr. Nunez might 
still be alive. Despite this failure, the County asserts that its jail uses 
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 1.  Ezra Klein, An Interview With Atul Gawande, Wash. Post (June 23, 2009), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/06/an_interview_with_atul_gawande.html.  
 2.  Kelly Davis & Jeff McDonald, Lapses in Treatment, Medical Care Spell Horrific Ends 
for Mentally Ill Inmates, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/watchdog/story/2019-09-21/lapses-in-treatment-
medical-care-spell-horrific-ends-for-mentally-ill-inmates. 
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modern systems to manage inmate treatment.3 But San Diego’s jail, 
like many correctional institutions across the country, chose paper over 
digital tools designed to handle transitions of medical care. All inmates, 
especially those most vulnerable, deserve a safe transition of care; it is 
past time for prisons and jails to adopt the tools that allow for an 
effective transition. 
Prior to his incarceration, Nunez threw a rock through a window, 
was found incompetent to stand trial, and committed to a state hospital 
for stabilization.4 Psychiatrists developed a plan to manage symptoms 
of his schizophrenia, including polydipsia, which is a pathologically 
excessive and dangerous thirst.5 Nunez was transferred from the 
hospital, and a nurse processed Nunez upon his arrival to the jail; two 
psychiatrists oversaw his continuing treatment.6 All three clinicians had 
access to internal electronic medical records, but relied on Nunez’s 
paper medical record to understand his prior medical history and 
treatment.7 The paper instructions mentioned compulsive drinking five 
separate times, and the hospital’s careful management of this 
symptom.8 The hospital’s records clearly stated that he should not be 
allowed access to tap water because of his psychiatric condition. 
Nevertheless, the jail placed Nunez in a standard cell with free access 
to tap water.9 He drank himself to death within days.10 Like many other 
at-risk inmates, Ruben Nunez was warehoused without basic medical 
accommodations.11 
Nunez’s death is representative of a broader pattern.12 Jails and 
 
 3.  Letter from William D. Gore, Sheriff, San Diego Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., to Disability 
Rights California at 8 (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-
attachments/DRCReport-FinalResponse-OCRd.pdf. 
 4.  Jeff McDonald, ACLU Intervenes in Federal Lawsuit to Unseal Records Related to 2015 
Jail Death, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/story/2019-05-14/aclu-intervenes-in-federal-
lawsuit-to-unseal-records-related-to-2015-jail-death. 
 5.  Davis, supra note 2. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See Timothy Williams, Jails Have Become Warehouses for the Poor, Ill and Addicted, a 
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/us/jails-have-
become-warehouses-for-the-poor-ill-and-addicted-a-report-says.html (reporting that mental 
illness contributes to longer-term jail stays). 
 12.  See Aaron J. Fischer et al., DISABILITY RIGHTS CALIFORNIA, SUICIDES IN SAN DIEGO 
COUNTY JAIL: A SYSTEM FAILING PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 12 (2018), 
https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/SDsuicideReport.pdf (finding 
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prisons are not typically designed for medical treatment,13 and 
correctional medicine is not transparent, which perpetuates failures in 
the transition of vulnerable prisoners.14 Nonetheless, jails and prisons 
have a constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical care to all 
detainees—those convicted and those awaiting trial. Each foreseeable, 
preventable death of a detainee defies that obligation. 
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishment” requires that correctional institutions provide healthcare 
to detainees.15 But inadequacies in inmate healthcare violate the Eighth 
Amendment only when corrections officials’ actions constitute 
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.”16 
Detainees alleging deliberate indifference must prove that an official 
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk of inmate health or safety.”17 
As a result of the deliberate indifference standard, corrections officials 
and institutions are insulated from liability for preventable deaths 
unless they knew of and ignored the risk of harm to an inmate. 
This Note argues that corrections officials’ failure to adopt 
reasonable standards for transitions of care creates a systemic risk 
inconsistent with their constitutional duties under the Eighth 
Amendment. A transition of care is a hand-off from one institutional 
healthcare provider to another. Transitions of care are particularly 
dangerous for vulnerable inmates—persons with serious medical needs 
that require accommodation to be safely held in custody. Transitions of 
care are increasingly enabled by digital networks that share health 
information,18 thanks in large part to mandates arising from the 
 
that screening for mental health needs upon entry into jail is extremely important but often 
overlooked). 
 13.  Id. at 9. 
 14.  See Suicide in North Carolina Jails: 2019 Jail Suicide Report, DISABILITY RIGHTS N.C. 
(2020), https://disabilityrightsnc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Report_Suicide-in-NC-
Jails_June-2020.pdf (finding unsafe conditions and a lack of mental health care in North Carolina 
jails); see Christine Wilmsen & Beth Healy, When Inmates Die of Poor Medical Care, Jails Often 
Keep It Secret, WBUR INVESTIGATIONS (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.wbur.org/investigations/2020/03/23/county-jail-deaths-sheriffs-watch (noting that 
circumstances of inmate deaths are often withheld from the public); see generally Dangerous 
Conditions in Prisons/Jails, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/1350-dangerous-conditions-in-prisons-jails (a 
curated collection of investigative reporting showing dangerous conditions in correctional 
institutions).  
 15.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (finding an 
“obligation to provide medical care for those whom [the state] is punishing by incarceration”). 
 16.  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
 17.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
 18.  See infra Part II.B (discussing the adoption of technology for sharing medical records in 
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HITECH Act of 2009.19 The Act used a series of short-term direct 
subsidies and long-term incentive payments to encourage the adoption 
of electronic health records.20 Since HITECH, instructions for 
transitions of care are increasingly easy to find and use.21 Although 
HITECH did not apply directly to correctional institutions, corrections 
officials must nevertheless adapt to changing standards by providing 
“services at a level reasonably commensurate with modern medical 
science and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional 
standards.”22 Therefore, correctional institutions expose themselves to 
liability by neglecting to adopt common tools specifically designed to 
manage movement of vulnerable people between institutions.23 
The risk to the lives of vulnerable detainees across the United 
States should be obvious. Nearly half of U.S. detainees have a chronic 
medical condition.24 People with serious mental illness are ten times 
more likely to inhabit a state jail than a state hospital.25 Vulnerable 
detainees suffer disproportionately from harsh correctional practices 
and are especially sensitive to poor conditions of confinement. 
Meanwhile, electronic systems that streamline and share health 
information are tools vital for combatting public health crises, including 
 
all 50 states based on federal government mandates and incentives). 
 19.  Prashila Dullabh et al., The Evolution of the State Health information Exchange 
Cooperative Agreement Program: State Plans to Enable Robust HIE, NORC AT THE UNIV. OF 
CHI. (Aug. 2011), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/state-health-info-exchange-
program-evolution.pdf (noting that HITECH “created unprecedented new funding and 
incentives for the adoption” of electronic health records and health information exchanges). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See, e.g., Patient Lookup – PatientCare 360®, CORHIO, 
https://www.corhio.org/services/health-information-exchange-services/for-ltc-skilled-nursing-
and-home-health/patient-lookup-patientcare-360-2 (last visited Mar. 3, 2021) (Although the 
process of accessing an HIE varies by state, the process of accessing a patient record is 
straightforward for a provider, and easily integrated into the intake process. For example, 
Colorado’s Health Information Exchange offers a web-based ‘Community Health Record’ that 
allows access to patients based on a lookup of name, birthday and other unique identifiers. A 
streamlined Continuity of Care Document may then be downloaded to a computer or imported 
directly into the Electronic Medical Record.). 
 22.  U.S. v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 23.  See infra Part IV.A (applying the Estelle standard to the growth of technology to 
facilitate transitions of care). 
 24.  Evelyn Malave, Prison Health Care after the Affordable Care Act: Envisioning an End 
to the Policy of Neglect, 89 NYU L. REV. 700, 704 (2014); LAUREN M. MARUSCHACK, ET AL., 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS 
AND JAIL INMATES, 2011–12, at 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpsfpji1112.pdf. 
 25.  Michael McCarthy, US Jails Hold 10 Times More Mentally Ill People Than State 
Hospitals, Report Finds, BMJ (April 10, 2014), https://www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g2705. 
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water contamination,26 opioid addiction,27 and the COVID-19 
pandemic.28 Prisoners are affected by these same issues, but many jails 
and prisons remain stuck in the paper world of yore. When reviewing 
an inmate’s hard-copy medical file, providers who assess a case too 
quickly can come away thinking routine schizophrenia instead of 
something actionable, like water restriction. Such errors are more 
common when there is a gap between correctional and medical 
systems—as when prisons rely on a mix of clumsy paperwork and more 
consistent computer systems to handle medically sensitive transitions. 
Now that mainstream medicine has adopted tools that facilitate a more 
seamless transition of care, jails and prisons must address those gaps. 
Part I describes Eighth Amendment requirements for medical 
transitions involving correctional healthcare providers. Part II provides 
an overview of standard practices in correctional healthcare as 
compared with mainstream medical transitions. Part III describes 
obstacles to correctional medical treatment that are ameliorated by 
effective communication with non-correctional medical providers. Part 
IV applies the Eighth Amendment standard to medical information 
systems used in the corrections context. Finally, Part V proposes 
reforms to improve the connectivity of jails and prisons in a national 
ecosystem of health information sharing. 
I.  THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITS HEALTH-INDIFFERENT 
TRANSITIONS AS CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
Prisoners have a constitutional right to adequate medical care.29 As 
medicine continues to advance, the minimum acceptable standard of 
 
 26.  See, e.g., David Wahlberg, Flint Doctor Used Epic Systems Records to Expose Lead 
Crisis, WIS. ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2016), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-fit/flint-doctor-
used-epic-systems-records-to-expose-lead-crisis/article_ef462592-f27b-5ed0-a2ff-
33232902ab74.html (reporting on the use of virtual health records in connection to the Flint water 
crisis).  
 27.  See, e.g., COLIN KONSCHAK & DAVE LEVIN, SANSORO HEALTH, THE EVOLVING ROLE 
OF HEALTH IT IN FIGHTING THE OPIOID CRISIS, 3–5 (2017), https://www.sansorohealth.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/Evolving-Role-of-Health-IT-in-Fighting-Opioid-Crisis-Divurgent-1.pdf 
(reporting on the use of virtual prescription drug monitoring programs). 
 28.  See, e.g., David Gurwitz, Repurposing Current Therapeutics for Treating COVID 19: A 
Vital Role of Prescription Records Data Mining, DRUG DEV. RESEARCH (2020), at 1 (discussing 
data mining health records to combat symptoms of COVID-19); see also Rebecca Robbins, 
Hospital Records Hold Valuable Covid-19 Data. Making it Usable is Time-consuming Work, 
STAT (May 27, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/27/mass-general-brigham-covid19-
genetics-biobank/ (discussing use of hospital records for COVID-19 research).   
 29.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“These elementary principles establish 
the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those it is punishing by incarceration.”). 
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medical care rises because the Eighth Amendment “must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.”30 This gradually enhances the standard of care 
that prison healthcare providers are obligated to deliver. As a result, 
inmates often receive accommodations for medical purposes that 
would have been rejected in previous eras.31 A key limitation on Eighth 
Amendment healthcare claims is the requirement that detainees prove 
a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” by corrections 
officials.32 Thus, corrections officials avoid liability unless a prisoner can 
show that the government intentionally ignored a medical issue. Even 
under such a lenient rule, systemic failure to account for medical 
information from other institutions makes a finding of deliberate 
indifference more likely. Therefore, jails and prisons that ignore Eighth 
Amendment requirements during inmates’ transitions create a 
substantial legal risk by failing to heed clear warnings relating to 
medical vulnerability. 
A.  The Constitution Guarantees Prisoners Receive Medical Attention 
The right to healthcare during incarceration is founded on the 
principle that “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of 
prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ 
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”33 In Estelle v. Gamble, the 
Court created a three-part test to determine whether corrections 
officials violate the Eighth Amendment, requiring inmates to show (1) 
a serious medical need, (2) officials’ deliberate indifference to the need, 
and (3) that the indifference caused an injury.34 The Fourteenth 
Amendment applies this standard to the states, such that county jails 
and state prisons are subject to the “deliberate indifference” standard 
as well.35 
 
 30.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 31.  See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (holding that excessive levels of 
secondhand smoke violated a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights). 
 32.  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.  
 33.  Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
 34.  See id. (“We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their 
response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access 
to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how 
evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action 
under § 1983.” (citing Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976))). 
 35.  Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Francis 
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947)); see also E.D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2019) 
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Estelle is noteworthy for both the right it established, and the low 
standard of care it permitted while finding that right. Inmate J.W. 
Gamble was assigned to a work detail unloading a truck when a bale of 
cotton fell on him.36 Prison medical staff provided pain relievers for a 
month before mandating that he return to work, despite his back 
“hurting as much as it had the first day . . . .”37 Gamble refused to work 
and was relegated to solitary confinement because of this refusal.38 Two 
months later a medical assistant diagnosed Gamble with a heart 
problem requiring hospitalization, in addition to high blood pressure, 
migraines, and ongoing pain.39 The Court recognized Gamble’s right to 
medical treatment, but held that no jailers or medical staff were 
sufficiently indifferent to his pain to constitute an Eighth Amendment 
violation.40 Prison officials avoided Eighth Amendment liability by 
permitting medical judgement to drive Gamble’s treatment and by 
acting to address his known medical issues.41 
Estelle makes clear that corrections officers may disregard some of 
inmates’ medical complaints without violating the Eighth Amendment. 
Permission to discount certain complaints is somewhat justifiable in the 
corrections context, where complete deference to inmate complaints 
would burden already limited prison resources. Despite the prison’s 
less-than-compassionate treatment of Gamble, they did intervene in his 
health crisis: three physicians assessed Gamble’s recovery during ten 
appointments following his back injury.42 Gamble received muscle 
relaxants and pain relievers, and the prison allowed him to remain on 
bed rest.43 The prison was not deliberately indifferent because its 
response to Gamble’s ailments was guided by professional medical 
 
(extending the deliberate indifference standard to cover immigration detainees and other forms 
of civil detention). 
 36.  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99. 
 37.  Id. at 100. 
 38.  See id. at 101 (noting that Gamble was kept in periods of “administrative segregation” 
and “solitary confinement”). 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. at 104 (“We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 
of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment.” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); see also id. at 107 (“Even 
applying these liberal [pleading] standards, however, Gamble’s claims against Dr. Gray, both in 
his capacity as treating physician and as medical director of the Corrections Department, are not 
cognizable under [the deliberate indifference standard of] § 1983.”). 
 41.  See id. at 107 (“A medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not 
represent cruel and unusual punishment.”) 
 42.  Id. at 107. 
 43.  Id. 
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judgement.44 
Correctional healthcare decisions following Estelle created a circuit 
split on standards for determining what qualifies as “serious medical 
need” under the Eighth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit applies an 
objective test based on documentation and perception, defining a 
serious medical need as one “diagnosed by a physician and mandating 
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily 
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”45 The Ninth Circuit 
uses a functional standard, involving a “condition [that] could result in 
further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.’”46 The Second Circuit crafted a more variable test that looks to a 
“non-exhaustive list” of factors, including a reasonable physician’s 
assessment, the effect of a condition on daily life, and the presence of 
chronic pain.47 According to any of these standards, correctional 
medical providers are required to take notice of either diagnoses of 
other physicians, or else apply their own judgement after reviewing 
some set of medical data. 
Once a serious medical need is identified, health practitioners 
working for a correctional institution must treat patients with a 
reasonable standard of medical care.48 This standard of care must be 
“reasonably commensurate with modern medical science and of a 
quality acceptable within prudent professional standards”49 and is 
governed by national standards, state law, and judicial precedent.50 
State laws on the standard of care vary, embracing either (a) a uniform 
national standard for certain specialties and procedures, (b) a standard 
based on treatment in a similar community, or (c) an assessment of 
reasonable action in similar circumstances.51 Local practices do not 
 
 44.  Id. The Court left the question of liability for non-medical prison officials to be 
determined on remand. 
 45.  Hill v. Dekalb, 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 
F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)). 
 46.  Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 
1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 47.  Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 
698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 48.  See BRIAN GLICK ET AL., JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL 710 (11th ed. 2017) (finding 
that the patient must have been denied “necessary medical help” in order to state a claim). 
 49.  U.S. v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 50.  Page Keeton, Medical Negligence – The Standard of Care, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 351, 
361 (1979) (“During the past twenty years, successive changes have been made in different states 
regarding the appropriate standard of care for physicians only some of which have been generally 
accepted”). 
 51.  See, e.g., Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 129 (D.C. App. 1977) (describing parameters 
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conclusively determine the standard of care but can demonstrate the 
possibility and practicability of an action given the common “skill and 
knowledge normally possessed” by local medical providers.52 
Some circuits have found that the Eighth Amendment imposes 
treatment obligations that extend beyond the walls of a correctional 
institution. In Wakefield v. Thompson, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
state must provide inmates receiving medical care with enough 
medicine “to cover their transition to the outside world.”53 In 2019, the 
Second Circuit found that “common sense and experience [support 
the] theory that discharge planning is part of in-custody care” while 
assessing a group of released inmates’ right to receive medical records, 
medication, and a continuity of care plan.54 The court determined that 
“a fact-finder could infer ‘reckless disregard’ beyond mere negligence 
or medical malpractice” because the prison failed to provide discharge 
planning information to vulnerable inmates.55 These holdings 
demonstrate the Eighth Amendment’s incorporation of medical 
progress, which requires corrections officials to accommodate inmates 
and share information in accordance with modern practices. 
Amidst these evolving standards, correctional institutions can 
mitigate the risk of liability by providing medical staff with 
straightforward instructions: act like you would at any other medical 
institution as much as possible and inform officials when something 
goes wrong. In short, the correctional institution must permit the 
exercise of professional medical judgement and not consciously ignore 
expert advice, or else risk a finding of deliberate indifference to the 
medical treatment that a clinician deems necessary to treat a detainee. 
B.  Ignoring Known Healthcare Instructions Constitutes Deliberate 
Indifference 
Corrections officials cannot avoid responsibility for healthcare by 
willfully ignoring systems that communicate inmate health needs. Even 
 
for a national standard); Slezak v. Girzadas, 522 N.E.2d 132, 135–36 (Ill. App. 1988) (discussing 
the locality standard); Chapel v. Allison, 785 P.2d 204, 210 (Or. 1990) (describing a broad “similar 
circumstance” test for general practitioners) (citing Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. 
Ass’n, 349 A.2d 245, 253 (Md. 1975)). 
 52.  McMullin v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 909, 910 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
 53.  177 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 54.  Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2019); see infra Part V (providing a 
full discussion of how a discharge planning requirement relates to the sharing of inmate health 
information).  
 55.  Charles, 925 F.3d at 89. 
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the subjective deliberate indifference standard “does not mean that 
[corrections] officials will be free to ignore obvious dangers to 
inmates.”56  Instead, officials may be liable for inaction with 
“knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”57 Therefore, when 
corrections officials know that instructions for treatment of a 
vulnerable inmate exist, those officials must incorporate those 
instructions into the treatment of an inmate. Ignoring such instructions 
for care disregards the judgement of a prior medical provider and 
creates a substantial risk of serious harm in the correctional institution 
receiving the vulnerable inmate. 
Mental health concerns, such as prevention of self-harm, present an 
additional challenge for institutions that are already stretched thin 
from managing more benign conditions.58 As a result, corrections 
officials are forced to triage mental health issues with limited time and 
incomplete information. In Gregoire v. Class, the Eighth Circuit 
scrutinized an inmate’s suicide while in a state penitentiary.59 The 
decedent, George Bouska, had called his ex-wife on the day of his death 
and communicated his suicidal ideation.60 His ex-wife then called to 
report the issue to a prison case manager, Butch Joffer, who checked 
Bouska’s file and delayed intervention for an hour, during which 
Bouska killed himself.61 In determining that Joffer was not liable under 
a deliberate indifference standard for his failure to take action in time, 
the court relied on the fact that Bouska’s ex-wife did not communicate 
any clinical history, only his current suicidal intent.62 The court absolved 
Joffer of liability because he took account of readily available 
information, which did not reference Bouska’s past mental health 
issues.63 
 
 56.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See Jorg Pont et al., Dual Loyalty in Prison Health Care, 102 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 
475, 475–80 (2012) (finding substantial risk of medical ethics violations resulting from a deficit in 
local resources); See Irina Franke et al., Prison Mental Healthcare: Recent Developments and 
Future Challenges, 32 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 342, 342–47 (2019) (describing 
increasing challenges in the face of mental health crises).  
 59.  236 F.3d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 60.  Id. at 416. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See id. at 417–18 (“There are no allegations or indications from the record that Joffer 
knew of Bouska’s previous classification ass a suicide risk . . . the only fact concerning Bouska’s 
suicide risk which Joffer knew of, and thus relevant to evaluating Joffer’s conduct, was the phone 
call from [his ex-wife].”). 
 63.  See id. at 419 (“There are no allegations or indications from the record that Joffer knew 
of Bouska’s previous classification as a suicide risk, of his hospitalization and treatment for 
depression, or his alleged earlier suicide attempt . . . .”) 
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Gregoire demonstrates that correctional institutions must account 
for medically relevant communications, even if they cannot prevent 
every incident of self-harm. Here, the court repeatedly referenced that 
the prison records lacked details about Bouska’s mental health history, 
and that his ex-wife did not communicate his mental health history or 
past suicidal ideation.64 Importantly, the court noted that “the only 
information Joffer had about the risk of Bouska’s suicide was the 
phone call from [his ex-wife].”65 The lack of a critical event prompting 
immediate action and the relatively short period between the call and 
the suicide supported the court’s decision to grant qualified immunity 
to Joffer and prison officials.66 The Eighth Circuit thus implied that 
reading instructions for inmate care (and acting reasonably in response 
to those instructions) is a defense to deliberate indifference. 
Medical staff providing direct services to inmates are similarly 
required to act reasonably when presented with instructions for care. 
In Pardue v. Fromm, the Seventh Circuit assessed an Eighth 
Amendment claim of failure to adequately restrain an inmate.67 Inmate 
Max Cole was designated for “potential suicide precautions” but was 
then left alone in a room with plastic bags, which he later used to kill 
himself.68 Here, the court determined that the doctors’ exercise of 
medical judgement and reasonable triage precluded a finding of 
deliberate indifference, even though medical staff should not have left 
Cole the tools to kill himself.69 Specifically, the court noted that 
“[l]iability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional 
is such a substantial departure from the accepted professional 
judgement, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person 
responsible did not base the decision on such a judgement.”70 In 
particular, Cole’s physician satisfied that standard by “review[ing] 
Cole’s medical chart and conduct[ing] an independent mental status 
examination.”71 Here, because the physician assessed available 
 
 64.  See id. at 416 (“Joffer’s case file on Bouska contained no mention of previous suicide 
threats or attempts or the fact that he was briefly placed on suicide watch. Nor did it contain 
medical or mental health information, information from Bouska’s health screening form, or 
Psychology Intake Interview Summary.”). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See id. at 419 (noting that Joffer’s actions should be evaluated “in light of the information 
he possessed at the time”).  
 67.  Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 68.  Id. at 258. 
 69.  See id. at 263 (holding that Cole’s physician’s treatment was not a substantial departure 
from accepted standards).  
 70.  Id. at 262 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)). 
 71.  Id. at 257 (later clarifying that the due diligence allowed an inference that the doctor 
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information and used his professional judgement, the court found that 
he was not deliberately indifferent. 
Inmates can also “establish deliberate indifference by showing that 
officials intentionally interfered with [their] medical treatment.”72 
Prison physicians interfere with medical treatment by consistently 
disregarding a serious medical need.73 When prison officials knowingly 
deprive an inmate of necessary treatment, that act is also deliberately 
indifferent.74 Similarly, when prisons ignore recommendations for 
intervention, including transfer to a hospital, that act may constitute 
intentional interference with treatment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.75 
At minimum, correctional institutions have a duty to heed known 
communications from other medical providers and to avoid interfering 
with necessary care. The Eighth Amendment does not require perfect 
healthcare and, indeed, often excuses actions that fall beneath the 
normal standard of medical care. But the exchange of information 
about serious medical needs is more common and less burdensome 
than ever before. Thus, under the Eighth Amendment, which accounts 
for changing standards of “dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and 
decency,”76 correctional medical providers must not only base their 
treatment on available instructions for care, but also adopt case 
management practices consistent with modern medical standards. 
 
“made a medical judgement that Cole did not need the suicide precautions attendant to ‘high risk 
suicide’ classification . . . [reaching a] subjective conclusion regarding the risk Cole posed to 
himself.”). 
 72.  Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 105 (1976)). 
 73.  See id. (“Lopez’s medical records show that when he returned to Corcoran, a doctor at 
the prison confirmed the hospital’s instructions that he receive a liquid diet through a straw. Yet 
in his affidavit, Lopez states that he received a blended diet, consisting of pureed food that he was 
unable to drink through a straw. Lopez also stated that he complained to prison officials, but that 
they declined to change his diet. These allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to Lopez, 
are sufficient to support a finding that prison officials intentionally interfered with his previously 
prescribed medical treatment.”). 
 74.  See Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1970) (describing deliberate 
indifference as encompassing “treatment so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all” after 
prison physicians intercepted properly prescribed medication and refused to distribute it to an 
inmate). 
 75.  See Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1284 (“After Dr. Rafford notified 
prison officials of Brown’s need for immediate hospitalization, they failed to transfer him for sixty 
days while he continued to suffer from gallstones. Presented with these claims, we do not hesitate 
to conclude that Brown alleges an Eighth Amendment violation.”). 
 76.  Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).  
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II.  MODERN TECHNICAL STANDARDS CREATE A HIGHER 
STANDARD OF CARE 
Prisons and jails frequently employ electronic health records 
(EHR) to manage inmate medical treatment.77 When implemented in 
the corrections context however, these EHR systems typically lack 
connections to outside medical providers. Indeed, as of 2018, less than 
five percent of state Departments of Corrections could exchange 
structured medical data through their EHR.78 Mainstream medicine is 
better connected by far. The HITECH Act of 2009 triggered a dramatic 
modernization of medical information technology among healthcare 
providers in the United States.79 Providers and state governments 
installed EHRs and began to connect them, allowing information to 
flow with the patient. Following a decade of building connections, every 
state now operates at least one Health Information Exchange (HIE) 
with basic competence in simplifying transitions of care.80 Healthcare 
providers use these exchanges to share life-saving information, 
including Continuity of Care Documents (CCD), which contain the 
medical history and instructions for care of a patient.81 The CCD 
standardizes transitions of care by ferrying data across institutional, 
technical, geographic, and clinical boundaries. Simplifying health 
information transactions in this fashion is critical to providing 
accommodations that protect an increasingly sensitive incarcerated 
population.82 
 
 77.  See infra Part II.A. 
 78.  See Gregory T. Woods et al., Accessing Prison Medical Records in the United States: A 
National Analysis, 2018, 34 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 2331, 2331 (2019) (“Most DOCs offered 
copies of medical records by mail (42/44, 95.5%) or fax (31/44, 70.5%). Fewer states had the 
capacity to send records through email (14/44, 31.8%) or via an electronic record system (2/44, 
4.5%).”). 
 79.  Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 80.  State Health Information Exchange Cooperative Agreement Program, OFF. NAT’L 
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.healthit.gov/topic/onc-
hitech-programs/state-health-information-exchange (listing funds allocated to states beginning in 
2010 to build HIE systems); see generally Julia Adler-Milstein et al., A Survey of Health 
Information Exchange Organizations in the United States: Implications for Meaningful Use, 154 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 666 (2011) (describing the current challenges in more specialized 
regional exchanges). 
 81.  See 42 C.F.R. § 482.43(e) (2009) (establishing CCDs as the technical standard for 
exchange of patient information) (comments available at: https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2019-
20732/p-337); see also A Quarter Billion Records Exchanged, EPIC INDUS. BUZZ (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.epic.com/epic/post/1507 (describing the volume of documents exchanged on one 
software vendor’s HIE platforms). 
 82.  Franke, supra note 58. 
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But twelve years after HITECH, the carceral health system remains 
exceptionally insular and digitally disconnected from hospitals and 
community medical providers. By and large, correctional institutions 
have not adopted data sharing practices that are considered best 
practices in the medical community—like exchanging CCDs for 
vulnerable individuals.83 Institutional resistance to correctional-
medical connections is increasingly difficult to square with a 
comprehensively connected private and public health system. The 
Eighth Amendment implies such connections must not be refused 
without good reason, especially to the extent that methods of sharing 
digital health information are considered a medically necessary 
practice. 
A.  The Criminal Justice System Uses Modern Systems Manage 
Internal Health Information 
National crises in mental health and drug addiction have put new 
pressures on corrections officials to properly care for inmates’ health. 
Simultaneously, the fruits of investment in EHR systems over the past 
decade have made it easier to understand how to keep vulnerable 
people healthy throughout incarceration. These systems lay a 
foundation for greater communication between correctional and 
mainstream medical providers. EHRs have spread through the criminal 
justice system but have yet to be networked in ways that mitigate the 
risk of transition for vulnerable detainees. 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) applies 
information sharing rules from the Health Information Portability & 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) to both prisoners and the general public. 
HHS’s final rule implementing HIPAA “removed the exception [that 
exempted] individually identifiable health information of inmates 
[from the Act].”84 As a result, prisons and jails transmitting electronic 
 
 83.  See generally John D. D’Amore et al., How the Continuity of Care Document Can 
Advance Medical Research and Public Health, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e1 (2012) (noting the 
widespread adoption of the CCD standard by EHR developers to address common barriers to 
information sharing among medical providers); See also John D’Amore, Interoperability Progress 
and Remaining Data Quality Barriers of Certified Health Information Technologies, 2018 AM. 
MED. INFORMATICS ASSN. ANN. SYMP. PROC. 358, 358 (noting that ability to share medical data 
is “essential to improve care quality and efficiency” and that “a majority of hospitals and 
physicians can electronically share data”).   
 84.  Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information; Protected Health 
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,496 (Dec. 28, 2000); see also generally Melissa M. Goldstein, Health 
Information Privacy and Health Information Technology in the US Correctional Setting, 104 AM 
J. PUB. HEALTH 803 (2014) (discussing applicability of HIPAA to correctional settings). 
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health information became “covered entities” obligated to meet 
standards of information privacy, security and portability while 
managing inmate health information.85 The sole remaining “security 
carveout” allows withholding inmate health information which would 
“jeopardize the health, safety, security, custody or rehabilitation [of 
inmates] or the safety of [correctional employees].”86 Overall, HIPAA 
standardized correctional and non-correctional information sharing 
under a consistent regulatory structure, which includes a patient-
centered right to access and transfer medical information.87 
HIPAA provided a legal foundation in corrections consistent with 
the mainstream health system’s requirements, which encouraged jails 
and prisons to implement commercial EHRs. As early as 2013, the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons adopted a single EHR to coordinate inmate 
health information across all federal prisons.88 Today, the Federal 
“Offender Management Suite” incorporates a variety of functions 
including an EHR that is integrated with other modules like case 
management, food services, and investigations.89 The integrated 
platform allows employees to access information according to their 
customized role, in either correctional operations, medical care, or a 
hybrid of the two. At the state level, Iowa, Michigan, and North 
Carolina have adopted the same EHR software used by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons.90 Meanwhile Georgia, Texas, and New York are 
among the states who have purchased or created their own software for 
similar purposes.91 
When state and local governments fail to adopt an EHR, it falls on 
 
 85.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2002) (defining a HIPAA covered entity as any health care provider 
who transmits a variety of electronic health information, including referral authorization and 
reports of injury). 
 86.  45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(ii) (2014) provides a security focused exception to the right to 
access medical records from correctional institutions. 
 87.  45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2014) contains a general right of access that extends to 
inmates provided security concerns do not apply. 
 88.   SONYA D. THOMPSON, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR 
THE BUREAU ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS INITIATIVE 2 (2013), 
https://www.bop.gov/foia/bemr.pdf.  
 89.  Offender Management Suite, ADVANCED TECHS. GRP., https://a-t-g.com/offender-
management-suite-103 (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
 90.  Our Partners, ADVANCED TECHS. GRP., https://a-t-g.com/our-partners-104 (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2021).  
 91.  See Michelle Martelle et al., Meaningful Use of an Electronic Health Record in the New 
York City Jail System, 105 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 1752 (2015) (noting that the New York City jail 
system successfully uses EHR technology to deliver improved patient care); see also Goldstein, 
supra note 84, at 803 (noting the use of a single EHR platform for correctional institutions in 
Georgia and Texas). 
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the local correctional health services provider to bridge this gap. For 
example, the largest provider of correctional health services in the 
United States, Corizon, offers consulting services to help their 
customers implement an EHR.92 Despite a push to modernize 
correctional case management systems, jails and prisons have adopted 
EHRs at lower rates than other healthcare providers.93 Reports on jails 
who are just beginning to “go electronic” indicate that stragglers may 
continue to rely on paper medical records for some time.94 Despite 
these gaps, EHRs are widely used by larger correctional health 
contractors and many state departments of corrections.95 
Jails and prisons across the country possess digital tools to manage 
inmate health, even without national standards for the exchange of 
stored information.96 The Eighth Amendment supplies a workable 
national guideline to share information necessary for medical care, 
which is further supported by regulatory standardization of health 
information under HIPAA.97  In short, botched transitions of care are 
less acceptable under the Eighth Amendment when they can be 
addressed by information sharing that is routine in a non-correctional 
context. Although correctional institutions are generally reluctant to 
share information, their insularity is increasingly at odds with modern 
medical practice. 
 
 92.  Choosing Corizon Health, Corizon Health, https://www.corizonhealth.com/Choosing-
Corizon/Technology (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (“Corizon Health has worked with many of the 
major EHR vendors for implementations and can leverage that experience to advise and assist 
our clients in selecting the best EHR solution for their facility(ies).”). 
 93.  See Goldstein, supra note 84, at 803 (summarizing a 2011 study which “showed a range 
of technological sophistication among prison facilities, with rare use of EHRs. Furthermore, there 
is very little electronic exchange of health information within correctional systems or between 
systems and community providers”).  
 94.  See, e.g., Leah Ingram Eagle, Inside the Walls: Technology, Personnel Highlight Behind-
the-Scenes Operation at Shelby County Jail, 280 LIVING (Jan. 25, 2020), 
https://280living.com/news/inside-the-walls-technology-personnel-highlight-behind-the-scenes-
operation-at-shelby-county-jail/ (remarking over ten years after HITECH that “[a] new piece of 
technology to the jail is using an Electronic Medical Records (EMR) program. According to the 
nurse supervisor, it will allow the medical staff to better care for the inmates and track them 
medically in a way they have never been able to do in the past”). 
 95.  Martelle, supra note 91 (“In jails and prisons, adoption of EHRs has mirrored that of 
community providers, with large systems making headway before smaller ones.”). 
 96.  Ben Butler, Health Information Exchange between Jails and Their Communities: A 
Bridge That Is Needed under Healthcare Reform, PERSPECTIVES IN HEALTH INFO. MGMT. (Jan. 
2014), http://bok.ahima.org/doc?oid=301194#.XoTwh4hKiUk; see also Benjamin Harris, How 
HIE can improve mental healthcare in prison, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/how-hie-can-improve-mental-healthcare-prison. 
 97.  Lester N. Wright, Health Care in Prison Thirty Years after Estelle v. Gamble, 14 J. 
CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE 31, 32 (2008); see also supra Part I.A. 
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B.  Mainstream Medicine Relies on Modern Tools for Exchange of 
Medical Instructions 
Medical enterprises rely on systems to coordinate care that are 
different in kind and more effective than the rows of filing cabinets 
more common in prior eras. The HITECH Act of 2009 began a process 
of modernization that provided hospitals with more than $25 billion to 
adopt EHRs and then become “Meaningful Users” of the systems.98 
Today, hospitals must share standardized health data as a condition of 
receiving Medicaid and Medicare funds (which make up a substantial 
portion of national healthcare spending).99 Systems that connect EHRs 
to one another now facilitate transitions of care between U.S. 
healthcare providers. 
To understand this system, consider what healthcare providers 
commonly exchange on information sharing networks: Continuity of 
Care Documents.100 CCDs are snapshots in time, capturing the vital 
details of a specific clinical interaction in a standardized digital format. 
Imagine two hospitals on opposite sides of the country and how their 
physical paperwork might differ. Beyond superficial formatting and 
ordering of data, medical records reflect clinical best practices, state 
regulation, and processes tailored to the local community. When 
transitions use a paper process, a hard copy is forwarded and then 
reentered in a new system (which introduces a risk of transcription 
errors) or scanned in as stored images (with a risk of missing content in 
an unfamiliar format). The CCD is a digital medical summary with a 
neutral format that solves these problems.101 This format works across 
EHRs, and standardizes how medical providers access critical 
information. 
CCDs are shared predominantly via Healthcare Information 
Exchanges (HIEs) which function as a trusted intermediary for medical 
information.102 When stored on an HIE, CCDs are more easily 
 
 98.  Marsha Gold & Catherine McLaughlin, Assessing HITECH Implementation and 
Lessons: Five Years Later, 94 MILBANK Q., 654, 655–57 (2016). 
 99.  See Scoring, Payment Adjustment, and Hardship Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS. (June 30, 2020, 9:21 AM), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/PaymentAdj_Hardship (explaining that eligible 
hospitals must report measures they have taken to promote “interoperability”). 
 100.  HL7/ASTM Implementation Guide for CDA R2-Continuity of Care Document (CCD) 
Release 1, HEALTH LEVEL SEVEN INT’L, 
https://www.hl7.org/implement/standards/product_brief.cfm?product_id=6 (last visited Mar. 3, 
2021).  
 101.  Id.  
 102.  See generally What is HIE?, OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH 
HAYES_03_08_21_FORMATTED W EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2021  2:13 PM 
2021] HANDLE WITH CARE: PRISONERS & MEDICAL INFORMATION SHARING 75 
accessible in “the cloud” available to healthcare providers.103  States 
began creating HIE systems in March 2010 using funds provided by 
HITECH. All states received grants (ranging from $4 million to $29 
million) to “rapidly build capacity for exchanging health information 
across the health care system both within and across states.”104 The 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services created programs under 
HITECH,105 which “place[d] an emphasis on health information 
exchange between providers” by implementing “new requirements for 
the electronic exchange of summary of care documents[.]”106 A revision 
to the program in 2017 began to enforce specific benchmarks for 
effective transitions of care, and penalties for non-compliance.107 
Federal intervention to improve communication of health 
information spurred meaningful systemic change.108 By 2017, 90 percent 
of hospitals receiving Medicare funds were electronically exchanging 
 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, https://www.healthit.gov/topic/health-it-and-health-information-
exchange-basics/what-hie (last visited Jan. 29, 2021) (describing the utility of an HIE and basic 
technical standards enabling those benefits). 
 103.  See, e.g., WISHIN Pulse Community Health Record, WIS. STATEWIDE HEALTH INFO. 
NETWORK (WISHIN), 
https://www.wishin.org/Solutions/HospitalsandHealthSystems/WISHINPulse.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2021); see also TJ. Winden et al., Care Everywhere, a Point-to-Point HIE Tool: Utilization 
and Impact on Patient Care in the ED, 5 APPLIED CLINICAL INFORMATICS 388, 393 (2014) (“Our 
results show that physicians perceive HIE, specifically [Care Everywhere], to be an invaluable 
asset in the [Emergency Department].). 
 104. State Health Information Exchange Cooperative Agreement Program, OFF. NAT’L 
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH. (May 3, 2020), https://www.healthit.gov/topic/onc-
hitech-programs/state-health-information-exchange. 
 105.  2017 Modified Stage 2 Program Requirements for Providers Attesting to their State’s 
Medicaid EHR Incentive Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Stage2MedicaidModified_Require. 
 106.  Stage 2 Overview Tipsheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 1, 4 (Aug. 2012), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/Stage2Overview_Tipsheet.pdf. 
 107.  Stage 3 Eligible Hospitals, Critical Access Hospitals, and Dual-Eligible Hospitals 
Attesting to CMS Health Information Exchange Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. (June 2018), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/HealthInformationExchange_2017.p
df 
 108.  See Connecting Health and Care for the Nation, A Shared Nationwide Interoperability 
Roadmap, OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., at x (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/hie-interoperability/nationwide-interoperability-
roadmap-final-version-1.0.pdf (noting that, as of 2015, “approximately 41 percent of hospitals 
nationwide routinely [had] electronic access to necessary clinical information from outside 
providers or sources when treating an individual . . . . [A]pproximately 78 percent of hospitals 
electronically sent a summary of care document and 56 percent received a summary of care 
document.”).  
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health information with at least one external provider.109 Over half 
could integrate that information into their EHR with no manual 
entry.110 In that same year, over 70 percent of hospitals connected to at 
least one national HIE that crosses regional borders.111 The nationwide 
trend of HIE adoption makes crucial information more accessible to 
all medical providers who treat a given patient. 
State-specific mandates112 combined with federal incentives to push 
medical providers across the country to transact in digital health 
information.113 Accessing CCDs through an HIE now gives healthcare 
providers a foundation for a patient’s treatment plan, rather than 
starting from scratch. Vulnerable patients with complex medical needs 
no longer have to cart around suitcases of paper to facilitate adequate 
care. Physicians can rely on peer notes when assessing unreliable 
narrators like children or individuals with developmental disabilities. 
Emergency departments can pull a sufficient medical record based on 
any identification found on unconscious patients. In short, the benefit 
of these systems is obvious—modern transitions of care save lives.114 
 
 109.  Annual Update on the Adoption of a Nationwide System for the Electronic Use and 
Exchange of Health Information, OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH. & DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 1, 9 (2018), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/page/2018-
12/2018-HITECH-report-to-congress.pdf. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Kate Monica, 70% of Hospitals Participated in Nationwide HIE Networks in 2017, EHR 
INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://ehrintelligence.com/news/70-of-hospitals-participated-in-
nationwide-hie-networks-in-2017.  
 112.  See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS § 10.37.07.03 (2011) (containing an outright requirement to 
connect to a government-run HIE); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 702 (2010) (requiring 
collaboration with a state HIE to receive public health funding); see also Frank Irving, Five Ways 
States Mandate Health Information Exchange, EHR INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://ehrintelligence.com/news/5-ways-states-mandate-health-information-exchange 
(describing various states’ approaches to incorporating HIE).  
 113.  See Hospitals Participating in the CMS EHR Incentive Programs, OFF. FOR THE NAT’L 
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH. (Aug. 2017), 
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Hospitals-EHR-Incentive-Programs.php 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (showing 98% nationwide compliance with a program requiring health 
information exchange by hospitals eligible for Medicaid funds).  
 114.  See, e.g., Raj Leventhal, Study: HIE Reduces Unplanned Hospital Readmissions, ED 
Visits in Western NY, HEALTHCARE INNOVATION (Feb. 17, 2020),  
https://www.hcinnovationgroup.com/interoperability-hie/health-information-exchange-
hie/news/21125779/study-hie-reduces-unplanned-hospital-readmissions-ed-visits-in-western-ny 
(stating that integration of HIE services into medical practices’ workflows reduced unplanned 
readmissions by 10.2% and reduced the rate of ED visits by 13.3%); see also AM. HOSP. ASS’N, 
SHARING DATA, SAVING LIVES: THE HOSPITAL AGENDA FOR INTEROPERABILITY 1, 3 (Jan. 
2019), https://www.aha.org/system/files/2019-01/Report01_18_19-Sharing-Data-Saving-
Lives_FINAL.pdf (noting that “[f]or the best outcome, it is imperative that accurate, 
standardized, accessible and exchangeable health information from all sources accompany 
patients every step of the way”). 
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III.   HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGES PROTECT VULNERABLE 
PRISONERS 
The Hippocratic oath to do no harm is complicated for doctors 
working in the criminal justice system because the doctor-patient 
relationship is compromised by security measures that often harm 
inmate patients.115 Medicine and punishment coexist uneasily because 
“[h]ealth care is required by the Constitution but is not a core 
competency” of corrections officials.116 Nonetheless, prisons and jails 
use electronic medical records and other sophisticated systems to track 
inmate needs. However, these correctional health systems are less 
effective when disconnected from external healthcare providers who 
may possess a better understanding of a given prisoner’s needs. 
Vulnerable prisoners require specialized health accommodations. 
Consequently, the methods that corrections officials use to triage 
medical needs are critically important to keeping prisoners healthy. If 
an inmate’s needs are not met, they may be exposed to a dangerous or 
life-threatening environment. Jails pose a unique danger to at-risk 
individuals due to high turnover of detainees and limited access to 
medical accommodations.117 In correctional institutions, scarce 
resources and harsh default conditions make collaboration between 
medical providers essential to keep vulnerable prisoners safe. 
Detainees are more medically needy than the general population,118 
and there is a deficit of clinicians to address those needs.119 More 
 
 115.  See Note, The Psychology of Cruelty: Recognizing Grave Mental Harm in American 
Prisons, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (2015) (describing the pernicious effects of solitary 
confinement); see also Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein et al., Association of Restrictive Housing 
During Incarceration with Mortality After Release, 2 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 8 (2019) 
(“[P]eople who had spent any time in restrictive housing during incarceration in a state prison in 
North Carolina were significantly more likely to die of all causes in the first year after release than 
those who did not.”).  
 116.  Kimberly Leonard, Privatized Prison Health Care Scrutinized, WASH. POST (July 21, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/privatized-prison-health-care-
scrutinized/2012/07/21/gJQAgsp70W_story.html?utm_term=.ce341fae1bfc (quoting Mark Hale, 
president and chief executive of Wexford Health Sources, a correctional medical provider). 
 117.  See, e.g., Steve Coll, The Jail Health-Care Crisis, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/04/the-jail-health-care-crisis (“Jails have a much 
higher turnover rate than prisons, where inmates generally serve long sentences. . . large numbers 
of people booked into custody are in a state of distress . . . [m]any jails are in rural or poor counties 
where administrators complain that they have neither the resources to hire, train, and supervise 
doctors and nurses in the particular demands that their facilities require.”). 
 118.  See Andrew P. Wilper et al., The Health and Health Care of US Prisoners: Results of a 
Nationwide Survey, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 666, 668–69 (2009) (finding that detainees have 
higher rates of medical and mental health issues than the general U.S. population). 
 119.  See Valerio Bacak & Greg Ridgeway, Availability of Health-Related Programs in Private 
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problematic still is the severe resource constraint in prisons which 
results from those issues: Correctional medical providers have limited 
time to fully understand an inmate’s health needs.120 Since providers 
have scarce time to spend with a prisoner, inmates who do not have a 
clearly documented medical need must advocate for themselves during 
intake and sick calls. Intake screening is intended to identify health 
risks and is most often performed by a nurse or medical assistant based 
on a checklist, which might not include specific issues flagged by 
previous medical providers. Sick calls allow inmates to advocate for 
themselves over time, but may also cost inmates money, making it less 
likely that inmates will report medical issues after the free initial 
screening.121 
In both the screening and sick call setting, clinicians must decide 
which health-focused interventions are necessary and which are 
impractical in the context of a security-focused correctional 
environment. Prisoners suffering from an addiction are frequently 
denied access to medications that stave off withdrawal.122 Inmates with 
mental illnesses are often restricted to solitary confinement, despite the 
fact that it often exacerbates their illness.123 Infection risks are left to 
fester when medical staff lack space to isolate sick inmates.124 Under 
the current system, vulnerable inmates often struggle in the typically 
harsh environment unless a busy clinician takes the time to lobby for 
an exception on their behalf. Implementing an HIE-connected EHR 
 
and Public Prisons, 24 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 62, 62 (2017) (“More than 1.5 million 
men and women . . . serve sentences in frequently understaffed and overcrowded facilities.”). 
 120.  See Sasha Abramsky and Jamie Fellner, Ill-equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with 
Mental Illness, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 94−97 (2003) (noting particular issues with availability 
of psychiatrists for medication management given large inmate populations on psychiatric 
medication); see Brian Sonenstein, All 50 States Report Prison Understaffing, PRISON LEGAL 
NEWS (Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2020/apr/1/all-50-states-report-
prison-understaffing/.  
 121.  See Wendy Sawyer, The Steep Cost of Medical Co-pays in Prison Puts Health at Risk, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/19/copays/ 
(noting that part of the reasoning behind requiring a co-pay is to “force [incarcerated people] to 
make difficult choices.”).  
 122. See Steve Horn, Opioid Epidemic Impacts Prisons and Jails, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 
5, 2019), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/sep/5/opioid-epidemic-impacts-prisons-and-
jails/ (citing a study by the National Sheriff’s Association which found that only around 270 out 
of 3,100 local jails nationwide offered medication-assisted treatment to treat opioid dependency). 
 123.  Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. 
Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 104–05 (2010). 
 124.  See David Brand, At Least 167 NYC Inmates, 114 Jail Staffers Now Have COVID-19, 
QUEENS DAILY EAGLE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://queenseagle.com/all/2020/3/30/at-least-167-nyc-
inmates-114-jail-staffers-now-have-covid-19 (describing how an outbreak of COVID-19 spread 
rapidly at an overcrowded Rikers Island in New York City). 
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would allow that busy clinician to more easily access critical health 
information, understand how to care for an inmates, and communicate 
ongoing issues to other healthcare providers. The resulting 
transparency would reveal hidden harms and unmet medical needs. 
IV.  THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES ENGAGEMENT WITH 
AVAILABLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR MEDICALLY SENSITIVE 
TRANSITIONS 
Several states require healthcare providers to connect to an HIE, 
while other states defer to the judgement of individual clinicians rather 
than categorically mandate HIE connectivity.125 In every state, 
however, national regulations and prevailing medical practice have 
pushed the exchange of medical information into a mainstream 
national standard of care.126 This trend has a downstream effect on 
constitutional requirements for transitions of care into a jail or 
prison.127 Correctional institutions must not ignore instructions 
contained in a CCD when those instructions are necessary to avoid 
denial, delay, or interference with medical treatment under the Eighth 
Amendment. Reliance on discarded medical practices (like paper-
based transitions) injures vulnerable inmates who are shuffled between 
institutions in a disorganized way.128 Failure to account for correctional 
treatment in an individual’s health history is particularly harmful given 
that incarceration is itself an adverse health event.129 Correctional 
 
 125.  Michael Hochman et al., Health Information Exchange After Ten Years: Time for A 
More Assertive, National Approach, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190807.475758/full/. 
 126.  Hospitals Participating in the CMS EHR Incentive Programs, OFF. FOR THE NAT’L 
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH. (Aug. 2017), 
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Hospitals-EHR-Incentive-Programs.php 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (By 2017, a state-by-state survey showed that over 95% of hospitals 
and associated clinics eligible for HITECH incentive payments could exchange electronic health 
information.). 
 127.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 128.  See, e.g., Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2006) (describing a botched 
transition of care between prisons where prison officials “knew when they bought Scarver back 
from Florence . . . that he would be at risk of severe distress. Probably they should have known, 
but that would make them guilty merely of negligence and not of deliberate indifference . . . . Of 
course they soon realized that Scarver was in serious distress because of his mental illness. But 
there is no indication that they attributed this to the [harsh conditions imposed by the new 
environment] . . . . and they state without contradiction that Florence had not forwarded any of 
its records of Scarver’s conduct there to the Wisconsin authorities, who may not have known that 
he had behaved better at Florence than he was behaving at Supermax.”). 
 129.  Chelsea Davis & David Cloud, Bridging the Gap: Improving the Health of Justice-
Involved People Through Information Technology, VERA INST. JUSTICE 7 (Feb. 2015), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/vera/samhsa-justice-health-information-technology.pdf. 
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institutions have a pragmatic incentive and constitutional duty under 
the Eighth Amendment to exchange medical information, using 
systems that the medical community has adopted, like sharing CCDs 
with state-based HIEs. For example, Wisconsin (home of one of the 
largest EHR developers, Epic) has already connected almost all of its 
correctional institutions to an HIE.130 Meanwhile, states like Missouri 
(home to another large EHR developer, Cerner) and North Carolina 
list no correctional institutions connected to their state HIE.131 
Correctional failure to adopt modern medical information sharing 
practices increases the risk of harm to inmates and thus violates the 
Eighth Amendment when this failure frustrates medical treatment. 
A.  Prisons’ Refusal to Adopt Modern Information Sharing Standards 
Interferes with Medical Treatment 
Prison officials who reject connection to HIEs are deliberately 
indifferent when that rejection denies, delays, or intentionally interferes 
with medical treatment.132 The fact that every state has an HIE in place 
highlights how absurd it is when jails and prisons plead mere ignorance 
after known medical issues cause harm. In a 2006 case prior to 
HITECH’s adoption, the Seventh Circuit found no constitutional 
liability for an inmate’s death based on a lack of actual knowledge that 
conditions of confinement caused harm.133 Critically, the court 
observed that, after making substantial efforts to assist the inmate, the 
healthcare providers “did not know what more to do” because a 
treatment plan used successfully at his prior institution was not 
provided to the new prison.134 But in areas where HIE use is 
widespread, these institutions have digital access to the patient’s 
previous plan of care. Today, corrections officials have a better system 
for understanding vulnerable inmates—their medical providers can 
 
 130.  Wishin Participant Map, WIS. STATEWIDE HEALTH INFO. NETWORK (WISHIN), 
https://www.wishin.org/ParticipatingProviders/WISHINParticipantMap.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 
2021). 
 131.  NC HealthConnex Participant Map, N.C. HEALTH INFO. EXCH. AUTH., 
https://hiea.nc.gov/patients/nc-healthconnex-participant-map (last visited Jan. 29, 2021); 
Participating Members, SHOW-ME HEALTH INFO. NETWORK OF MO., 
https://www.shineofmissouri.com/Patient-Resources/Participating-Providers.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2021). 
 132.  Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97 (1976)) (“Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs 
when they ‘deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.’”). 
 133.  See Scarver, 434 F.3d at 977  (“Scarver has failed to cite evidence to overcome the 
defendants’ denials that they knew these conditions were making his mental illness worse.”). 
 134.  Id. at 975. 
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access tools like an HIE. 
The Eighth Amendment standard of medical care changes over 
time, and correctional institutions must respond by adopting tools that 
clinicians need to do their jobs.135 For example, certain medical supplies 
are required by regulation of correctional facilities.136 A stethoscope or 
bandage are vital tools kept in-house to satisfy local medical standards, 
while inmates might be transferred to a hospital for a surgery or an X-
ray.137 The question for corrections officials is where tools like the HIE 
database sit along this spectrum. For instance, imagine a prison housing 
a diabetic inmate in 1960, the same year the glucose test strip was 
invented. Few would have faulted a prison for failing to stock the 
brand-new technology. But after the technology became widely 
available, a warden may have been deliberately indifferent for refusing 
to keep the necessary test strips on hand because it may have imperiled 
the diabetic inmate’s health. Likewise, today, if a prison fails to keep 
pace with industry record keeping standards, the prison would be liable 
for violating the constitutional guarantee of adequate care. 
More than ten years after HITECH, HIEs more closely resemble a 
commonly needed diagnostic aid than a novel tool. The 
implementation of an HIE in every state implies that the technology 
has been widely adopted. Clearly then, prisons are behind the curve. If 
correctional clinicians already possess the infrastructure needed to 
inform a transition of care (like a computer, an electronic medical 
record, and an internet connection), then corrections officials should 
avoid placing obstacles (like restrictive information sharing policies, or 
outright refusal to connect to an HIE) between medical providers and 
the routine use of readily available tools. 
The failure of corrections officials to heed communications from 
non-correctional healthcare providers may constitute deliberate 
indifference to an inmate’s medical needs.138 Courts look to the 
information communicated by other providers when determining the 
 
 135.  See supra Part II.A (discussing the evolving medical standard of care and implications 
for technological progress). 
 136.  See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120:1-8-09 Standards for Jails in Ohio, Medical/Mental 
Health 5120:1-8-09 (requiring equipment considered medically necessary for a receiving screen 
among other essential services, while permitting referrals for emergency treatment and 
specialized services). 
 137.  See id.  
 138.  See supra Part I.B (discussing the requirement to heed known instructions for medical 
care); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 515 
U.S. 472 (1995) (holding that ignoring inmate health concerns may constitute deliberate 
indifference). 
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degree of indifference to a serious medical need.139 In other words, the 
court asks, “What information did the prison have about the inmate at 
the time the incident occurred?” A correctional institution that 
categorically fails to account for the most common and simplest form 
of communication, the CCD, must have an effective alternative process 
to comply with the Eighth Amendment. An alternative process that 
does not provide the benefits of a CCD in a transition of care would 
logically deny, delay, or interfere with medical treatment of some 
vulnerable inmates. Any inmates injured in a transition under such an 
inadequate system could rely on the systemic communication failure to 
satisfy the deliberate indifference standard for an Eighth Amendment 
claim. 
Willful blindness is not a defense to intentional interference with 
prisoner medical treatment.140 Corrections officials should be wary of 
patterns of failure in paper transitions of care and should carefully 
consider requests by medical staff to simplify or modernize transitions. 
A policy that broadly inhibits access to medical information constitutes 
deliberate indifference. To avoid harming inmates and concomitant 
Eighth Amendment liability, corrections officials must enable their 
medical staff to take the same steps as any other medical provider to 
understand and act on the medical history of a given patient. 
B.  Compromises Necessary for Correctional Triage Do Not Excuse 
Systematic Departure from the Standard of Care for Medical 
Transitions 
Prison policies that abrogate constitutional rights must be 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” to avoid 
liability for resulting harms.141 Under this rule, correctional healthcare 
mandated by the Eighth Amendment is exempt from some mainstream 
medical practices that affect institutional security and safety.142 The 
penological interest exception must be justified by “discretion to devise 
reasonable solutions to problems” that threaten “safety and order” in 
 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id.; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991) (holding that prison officials must 
consider a constellation of relevant conditions because “[s]ome conditions of confinement may 
establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone” 
when the combination would impact an identifiable human need). 
 141.  Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 
(1987)).  
 142.  See supra Part III (discussing principles of medicine affected by security-focused 
institutions). 
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detention centers.143 However, corrections officials remain liable for 
botched transitions of care when their interference with medical 
treatment (through restrictive or ineffective medical information-
sharing policies) is not penologically justified. 
HIE connections do not negatively impact penological interests.144  
While health information systems and connections do cost money, the 
cost excuse is less compelling in the corrections context because a “lack 
of financing is not a defense to the failure . . . to provide minimum 
constitutional standards” in corrections.145  Even if budget issues were 
an appropriate defense to constitutional claims, the start-up cost of an 
HIE connection for an entire jail or prison146 is reasonable when 
compared to health expenditures per inmate,147 and such connections 
are heavily subsidized by the federal government.148 Additionally, many 
HIEs offer low-cost options including internet-based access to CCDs.149 
Some state governments even subsidize costs entirely for public or 
nonprofit providers like departments of corrections, or situationally 
during health crises requiring broad-based action to safeguard public 
health.150 
The primary statute governing inmate medical information, 
HIPAA, reaffirms that corrections officials cannot unjustifiably 
interfere with communication that is vital for medical treatment.151  
 
 143.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 566 US 318, 326 
(2012).  
 144.  See Ben Butler, Implementing and Integrating Health IT Solutions within a Correctional 
Environment, 21 J.  INTEGRATED DESIGN AND PROCESS SCI. 47, 53 (Nov. 22, 2017) (discussing 
an effective implementation and typical obstacles, which do not include safety and order issues 
that qualify as penological interests).  
 145.  Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 744–45 (D.V.I. 1997) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny 
County Jail v. Wecht, 699 F. Supp 1137, 1146 (1988)). 
 146.  See Butler, supra note 96 (describing in Case Study 2 a $20,000 fee for connection to a 
county HIE as part of a strategic effort to reduce recidivism). 
 147.  Matt McKillop, Prison Health Care Spending Varies Dramatically by State, PEW TRUSTS 
(Dec. 15, 2017), https://bit.ly/32STm64 (finding an average nationwide healthcare cost per inmate 
of $5,720 annually, with states varying from a high of $19,796 in California, to a low of $2,173 in 
Louisiana).  
 148.  Ben Butler, New HIE Funding Opportunities for Corrections: Health Information 
Technology’s Role in Reducing Mass Incarceration, CMTY. ORIENTED CORRECTIONAL HEALTH 
SERVS. (Mar. 2016) (noting that, beginning in 2016, correctional health providers “could 
participate in the 90% federal matching rate (90/10) for state activities to promote [HIE] for the 
coordination of care). 
 149.  See Butler, supra note 96 (describing in Case Study 1 a web-portal to an HIE that cost 
$25 per month per healthcare provider).  
 150.  Announcing Free Access to WISHIN Pulse, WIS. ST. HEALTH INFO. EXCH. NETWORK 
(May 6, 2020), https://wishin.org/ResourceCenter/FREEAccesstoWISHINPulse.aspx. 
 151.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(ii) (2014). (providing a security-focused exception as the 
only out for correctional institutions seeking to withhold medical information from the inmate 
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Still, some corrections officials argue that refusing to share health 
information among medical providers is justified because it reduces 
institutional security.152 It does not. Specifically, neither CCD use nor 
an HIE connection harms the “health, safety, security, custody or 
rehabilitation [of inmates] or the safety of [correctional employees]” 
which are the only bases for an exception to medical information 
sharing under HIPAA.153 At intake, a physician reviewing a CCD is 
simply informing themselves of what happened prior to the detainee’s 
arrival, and perhaps validating the detainee’s answers. The narrow data 
set contained in a CCD sent to an HIE does not contain any details 
that inmates themselves are not aware of. Therefore, release of a CCD 
for medical treatment does not increase risks to institutional security. 
Unfortunately, correctional-medical transparency is unjustifiably 
limited by de facto practices in several states. Louisiana, an extreme 
example, refuses to share prisoner medical records without a court-
enforced subpoena, even with other medical providers treating an 
inmate following release.154 Louisiana’s outright refusal to share 
medical information violates the spirit of the federal prohibition on 
“data blocking” in healthcare.155 More importantly, unnecessary 
obstacles to accessing medical information threatens to harm detainees 
through delay, denial, or interference with prisoner medical treatment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.156 Louisiana’s aberrant 
standard demonstrates how state practices control correctional-
medical transitions157—at least until courts have an opportunity to 
review those specific practices in the context of an injured prisoner. 
 
themselves); see also Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that failure 
to release sufficient medical information post-incarceration violates the Eighth Amendment.).  
 152.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Keller, Reader Question: How Should We Handle Inmate Requests for 
their Medical Records?, JAIL MED., July 10, 2015, https://www.jailmedicine.com/reader-question-
how-should-we-handle-inmate-requests-for-their-medical-records/ (“Some jails have used 
[HIPAA’s correctional exception] to issue blanket denials to all inmate requests for medical 
records.”). 
 153.  45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(ii) (2014). 
 154.  See Woods et al., supra note 78 (“Five [Departments of Corrections] . . . did not allow 
patients to access their own records without a subpoena and one state, Louisiana, required 
subpoenas from both patients and providers.”). 
 155.  21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 4004 (2016) (defining prohibited 
information blocking by healthcare providers as a practice that is “unreasonable and is likely to 
interfere with, prevent, or materially discourage access, exchange, or use of electronic health 
information”). 
 156.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). 
 157.  See Woods et al., supra note 78 (finding that less than half of states could sending a 
record without using physical paperwork, and that most states charged by the page for hard copy 
records.). 
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In short, Congress has recognized that health information sharing 
is vital to the continuity of care, and the HIPAA exemption corrections 
officials invoke to withhold medical records is not applicable to the 
narrow dataset traded on an HIE. The Eighth Amendment prohibits 
corrections officials from interfering with inmate care: They must 
recognize the risks of failing to share medical information consistently, 
which is not offset by a security benefit.158 As medical providers in rural 
and resource-challenged areas make progress in connecting to one 
another, correctional medical providers wield a feeble justification for 
failure to do the same.159 Where corrections officials neglect to share 
medical information in the most common and consistent fashion, the 
public will justifiably wonder—what are they hiding? 
V.  A NEW BARE MINIMUM: PREVENTATIVE REFORMS AND 
LIABILITY FOR BOTCHED TRANSITIONS 
Correctional institutions have long been reticent to share 
information about historically subpar medical services. But that is not 
a legal defense for failing to adhere to widely accepted medical 
standards. This Note proposes two solutions. First, state governments 
should recognize the underutilization of correctional HIE connections 
and mandate their use to ensure consistency in correctional-medical 
transitions. States possess legislative tools to proactively protect 
vulnerable inmates. Second, failure to adhere to baseline standards of 
care in medical transitions should trigger Eighth Amendment liability. 
Transitions of care enabled by widespread use of CCDs already make 
it easier for prisoners to prove a breach of the deliberate indifference 
standard when corrections officials systematically reject medical 
information. State courts and the other Circuits should adopt the 
Second and Ninth Circuit approaches requiring engagement with post-
correctional medical providers, and imposing liability for failures in 




 158.  See supra Part I.B (discussing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 159.  See Matt McKillop, Health Care Continuity After Prison Protects Investments and 
Progress, PEW TRUSTS (June 22, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/articles/2018/06/22/health-care-continuity-after-prison-protects-investments-and-
progress (noting that records-sharing is a critical tool to help connect incarcerated people with 
providers on the outside to help safely manage illnesses and medications). 
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A.  State-Based Reforms Would Facilitate Effective Correctional 
Transitions 
There is a straightforward solution to uneven standards that 
continue to threaten vulnerable inmates: States should mandate the use 
of HIEs in correctional institutions.160 State legislatures frequently 
require law enforcement officials to adopt similar systemic civil rights 
protections which exceed the minimum constitutional standards set out 
by the courts.161 State laws requiring connections between correctional 
facilities and a state HIE could be modeled on existing statues 
governing healthcare exchange among non-correctional healthcare 
providers.162 Such laws would benefit prisoners and reduce the risk of 
litigation by embracing the foundations of intake and discharge 
planning which are now common in mainstream medicine. A 
healthcare connectivity mandate would reduce dangerous gaps in 
communication for detainees with complex medical histories, including 
individuals with disabilities, mental illness, or chronic conditions. 
A data-sharing mandate would promote transparency and 
cooperation between correctional and non-correctional medical 
providers. This is especially important for prisoners who move between 
institutions and those who require further medical services after 
release. Without a centralized system, the differing requirements of 
jails, prisons, and hospitals (among other healthcare settings) tend to 
frustrate communication by mixing extraneous with life-saving 
 
 160.  While a national data sharing mandate would be more consistent and arguably more 
effective in promoting safe transitions of care, such a statute would face substantial political and 
legal obstacles. A majority of prisoners occupy state facilities—a regulatory sphere typically 
reserved for state governments. The federal government may not impose regulations on the states 
that exceed standards necessary to avoid a specific constitutional harm as declared by the 
Supreme Court (which has not yet taken up cases relating to the continuity of care). See, e.g., 
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020) (holding that Congress lacks authority to abrogate 
states’ sovereign immunity when that abrogation “sufficiently connects to conduct courts have 
held [the Fourteenth Amendment] to proscribe”); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62, 81–83 (2000) (holding that mandates applicable to states under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act can only support damages claims in areas of traditional state authority when 
authorized by a statute with congruence and proportionality to a clear constitutional harm). Note 
however that the federal government may enact similar reforms in the federal prison system 
(which is already somewhat networked) and the immigration detention system (which has far 
more gaps).   
 161.  See, e.g., N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 60.45(3)(a) (requiring a video recording of 
confessions to certain crimes); see also N.J. STAT ANN. § 40A:14 (2020) (requiring law 
enforcement officers wear and activate body cameras during certain interactions with the public; 
see also OR. REV. STAT. § 161.205(2) (prohibiting use of chokeholds by corrections officers). 
 162.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 702(2) (2010) (requiring healthcare providers 
collaborate with Vermont Information Technology Leaders, which facilitates the state HIE). 
HAYES_03_08_21_FORMATTED W EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2021  2:13 PM 
2021] HANDLE WITH CARE: PRISONERS & MEDICAL INFORMATION SHARING 87 
information during transition. State HIEs can provide a bridge that 
connects prisoners across these environments. An HIE organization is 
well positioned to understand where the continuity of medical care 
fails, and which correctional institutions to prioritize for connection. 
Legislators should enact information sharing mandates that require 
carceral healthcare providers to share information from three key 
points during incarceration: intake, sick call, and release. By sharing 
information when inmates interact with medical staff, corrections 
officials can ensure that their systems are designed to avoid deliberate 
indifference to known medical needs. 
First, a standard medical intake process aided by a CCD would 
improve the accuracy and efficiency of screening. In the correctional 
context, screening is vitally important because roughly half of the 
incarcerated population lives with a chronic medical condition.163 
Correctional institutions receiving inmates from a medical setting 
(surgery, psychiatric stabilization, drug treatment, etc.) should ensure 
that medical providers access an HIE and apply insights from a recent 
CCD to the inmate’s new treatment plan. A more consistent option is 
to implement HIE checks for all inmates on arrival to inform their 
conditions of confinement. This precaution protects correctional 
institutions from liability by affirmatively acting on known medical 
information and thus avoiding deliberate indifference.164 
Second, state law should require that correctional institutions 
document ongoing correctional healthcare in an HIE. The sick call 
system provides an ideal point of contact for this documentation 
because it necessarily involves inmate-provider interaction. Review 
and reconciliation of past treatment during sick call would help medical 
providers spot issues with current treatment, while creating a durable 
record of care across institutions. Incorporating HIE interaction into 
the existing sick call process would not further burden institutions, 
because it could be integrated into existing procedures. If directed by 
law, corrections officials would ensure that medical providers have 
access to an HIE/CCD lookup for any medical appointment, and HIE 
organizations could indicate when prisons or jails are not complying 
with the mandate. 
Third, correctional institutions should be required to push a CCD 
 
 163.  MARUSCHACK ET AL., supra note 24. 
 164.  See supra Part I.A (discussing the Eighth Amendment obligation to heed medical 
instructions). 
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to their state HIE upon release of an inmate. This is an area of low 
security risk, but high potential value to the public health system 
overall. Medical information from the prison, including medications 
and treatment plans, are needed by healthcare professionals working 
with inmates on release. When a former inmate seeks assistance from a 
medical or social service provider back home, those providers may seek 
the patient’s consent to access prior records. State law should require 
that correctional institutions participate in this continuity of care—
informing providers about what happened during incarceration, with 
the goal of improving the quality and efficiency of care both in and out 
of custody. 
Even if an inmate does not have documented prior medical history, 
these protocols would avoid deliberate indifference systematically at 
intake, discharge, and during active medical treatment which may result 
in transfer to another facility. Such communications with outside 
medical providers are especially important for prisoners who are not 
already receiving services from the non-correctional health system.165 
Prisoners experience high rates of medical complications following 
incarceration.166 Policymakers focused on this problem should structure 
data sharing mandates to connect vulnerable inmates with post-
custody healthcare. Consistent reporting requirements for specific 
harms to vulnerable inmates would permit systematic analysis of of 
strategies to reduce the risks of correctional transitions. In this manner, 
consistent HIE connections would inform a more effective 
correctional-medical system. 
B.  Courts Should Impose Liability for Reckless Transitions Upon 
Arrival and Release from Custody 
Correctional institutions that needlessly obstruct prisoner medical 
care are liabilities for the governments that fund them because those 
governments often indemnify corrections officials who harm inmates 
while acting in their official capacity.167 Over ten years after the 
modernization of medical information standards in HITECH, courts 
 
 165.  See generally Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Release from Prison—A High Risk of Death 
for Former Inmates, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 157 (2007) (describing trends in post-corrections 
fatality that might be mitigated by engagement with post-correctional medical services).   
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1676 n.391 (2003) 
(noting that “the typical arrangement, usually by statute, is that the correctional agency 
indemnifies its officers unless the act on which a lawsuit is predicated was outside the ‘scope of 
employment’ or was intentional or malicious”).  
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are finally beginning to invalidate correctional policies that inhibit the 
continuity of medical care. The choice for state and county 
governments is clear: suffer costly court proceedings on the road to 
compliance, or else adopt a system to account for the needs of 
vulnerable prisoners during transition.168 
Inmates are winning lawsuits based on the failure of correctional 
institutions to provide a transition of care. Discharge planning is 
increasingly viewed by the courts as a critical component of in-custody 
medical care, allowing inmates to sue for post-incarceration injuries.169 
The Second and Ninth Circuits now hold that a right to medical 
treatment extends beyond prison walls, requiring that corrections 
officials cooperate with post-correctional medical providers.170 
Simultaneously, some district courts recognize that systemic failures in 
medical care are sufficient to support an individual inmate’s claim of 
deliberate indifference—even without actual knowledge of that 
inmate’s vulnerability.171 In circuits without an explicit discharge plan 
requirement, prisoners might also allege systemic failures at intake, 
especially where a pattern of botched transitions puts officials on notice 
of systemic danger. While the affirmative duty to provide a discharge 
plan has not been assessed in every court, constitutional standards for 
the intake function are well defined, and require prison officials to 
avoid interference with medical judgement and communication.172 
Under the prevailing standard, proving deliberate indifference is a 
herculean task.173 One that is incongruent with the “evolving standards 
 
 168.  See Ben Butler, Meaningful Use and Corrections: Unknown Opportunities, CMTY 
ORIENTED CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVS. (June 2014), https://cochs.org/files/health-it-
hie/cochs-meaningful-use.pdf (describing the risks of a correctional healthcare “black box” and 
the benefits of connectivity with non-correctional providers). 
 169.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing factors in the discharge planning 
requirement).  
 170.  See Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 88–90 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that medically 
vulnerable detainees may state an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide discharge 
planning); See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that inmates 
must be provided with medication and other supports necessary to “cover their transition to the 
outside world.”); see also E.D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing the standards 
laid out in Charles v. Orange County to extend deliberate indifference to the immigration context 
without specifically discussing transitions of care). 
 171.  See, e.g., Caramillo v. Correct Care Sols., 2020 US Dist. LEXIS 85403 at *22 (E.D. Va. 
2020) (holding that plaintiffs may adequately plead gross negligence against prison official by 
alleging facts showing officials are aware of “the dangers posed by an allegedly inadequate 
medical care system”). 
 172.  See supra, Part IV.A (discussing the Eighth Amendment mandate to avoid undue 
interference with medical communication). 
 173.  See Shevon I. Scarafile, Deliberate Indifference or Not: That is the Question in the Third 
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of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”174 As such, 
the remaining eleven Circuits should follow the Second and Ninth in 
imposing Eighth Amendment liability for correctional institutions’ 
failure to provide an adequately modern transition of care in the course 
of inmate treatment. Circuits considering how the deliberate 
indifference standard applies to correctional intake and discharge 
should undertake a factual inquiry to determine the elements of a non-
correctional transition of care, and then incorporate those elements 
into concrete standards for corrections officials. 
One shortcoming of this approach is that injunctions that alter 
prison practices tend to be narrowly drawn.175 Without legislative 
action, outdated correctional practices will leave behind prisoners with 
inadequate access to legal services. If the issue of correctional-medical 
transition is left to the courts, prison litigation will result in a patchwork 
of inconsistent Eighth Amendment safeguards. Therefore, both 
legislative action and judicially mandated reform are needed to secure 
the wellbeing of inmates as they enter and exit custody. 
CONCLUSION 
Ineffective transitions of care kill people moving into and out of 
correctional institutions. The failure to calibrate conditions of 
confinement to individual needs can seriously harm inmates, even 
before a finding of guilt or innocence. Modern medicine has developed 
new tools to manage these risks, and correctional medical providers 
must adopt the same tools to provide adequate medical care. Medical 
providers have coalesced around a standard digital format because 
reliance on inconsistent paper processes costs lives. Jails and prisons are 
largely capable of transacting in that information, but they most often 
choose not to. Over ten years after HITECH, state legislatures and the 
courts should act to ensure that unconstitutional practices in the 
criminal justice system do not perpetuate bad outcomes in the health 
system. 
 
Circuit Jail Suicide Case of Woloszyn v. Lawrence County, 51 VILL. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2006) 
(noting that plaintiffs seeking to prove “deliberate indifference” bear the burden of illustrating 
that custodial officers both “knew of the . . . detainee’s vulnerability . . . and did not act 
affirmatively” to prevent harm). 
 174.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 175.  Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 333 (2000) (“Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a 
court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is 
narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right, and 
is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.”). 
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The risk to Ruben Nunez’s life at San Diego Central Jail should 
have been obvious. He arrived from a psychiatric hospital. He carried 
with him a paper packet that described his vulnerability. It contained 
scattered instructions on how to keep him healthy. But that document 
was not enough to keep him alive. Vulnerable prisoners like Ruben 
deserve more. People deprived of their liberty deserve a modern 
medical system that handles people with a lot more care. 
 
